What's left of the left? Democrats and social democrats in challenging times.
| Author | Cronin, James |
| Position | Roundtable |
Introduction
Mark Wickham-Jones, Professor of Political Science in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol
It comes as no surprise that advocates of progressive politics across Europe, as well as North America for that matter, currently confront a number of severe challenges to their favoured project. The crisis in the eurozone raises profound question marks about the nature of the left's economic model, most obviously in its capacity to combine economic recovery with the social commitments that define a reformist approach. The banking crisis of 2008 filtered through the collapse of housing markets, most notably in the United States, and an explosion of public debt, paved the way for prolonged recession across many advanced industrial economies. Though left governments were by no means the only candidates for blame, the economic downturn challenged assumptions about a number of variants of the progressive model, whether in terms of New Labour's predominantly neo-liberal approach with its emphasis on a lightly regulated financial sector or of the differing forms of the social model to be found across continental Europe. Most obviously, of course, the emphasis currently placed on retrenchment and spending cuts as the necessary means of stabilising debt challenges the notion of a progressive politics.
At the same time, many European social democratic parties have experienced severe reversals at the ballot box. After thirteen years in power and three successive general election victories, New Labour lost office in May 2010. It was not alone. Since September 2009 and September 2006 respectively, the German SPD and the Swedish social democrats have been in opposition. The success of Barack Obama in 2008 seemed an isolated example of progressive success, one that is arguable in its orientation and, in the mind of many, disappointing in its execution. Only recently with the success of Francois Hollande in the 2012 French presidential elections, and the re-election of Obama, have the fortunes of the left turned up slightly.
The publication of What's Left of the Left, edited by James Cronin, George Ross and James Shoch, marks, accordingly, a particularly useful point at which to appraise the conjuncture. How did progressive politics come to be in such a situation and what are the prospects for such an outlook at the present time? What's Left of the Left brings together an impressive range of scholars, mostly based in North America. Different chapters in the volume develop historical and thematic perspectives as well as a number of case studies and the book is notable in offering a direct comparison between European social democ-racy and progressive politics in the United States. This roundtable, held at the University of Bristol in June 2012 and organised by the Labour Movements Group of the Political Studies Association, addresses these questions through a discussion of the volume. Perhaps inevitably, a particular focus is on the British situation and the case of New Labour (tackled by James Cronin in the book).
Developing the social democratic model in Britain and Sweden
Mark Wickham-Jones
Twenty years ago, in a panoramic survey of social democratic politics, Perry Anderson (1992, 1994) drew a distinction between reformist parties in Northern Europe and those in the south of the continent. The former, including the British Labour Party as well as the Swedish social democrats, were characterised by a general sense of retreat as they lost ground in political and intellectual terms. By contrast, reformist parties in Southern Europe enjoyed better, though still mixed, fortunes. Consolidating democratic reforms and enacting some welfare provision, social democrats in such polities had enjoyed some successes and offered greater future potential than their northern counterparts. Two decades later, aspects of Northern social democracy, typified by the trajectories of the British Labour Party and the Swedish social democrats, may have proved more durable than critics had anticipated earlier.
To be sure, the British Labour Party underwent a profound modernisation during the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the jettisoning of many policy commitments, the adoption of a new electoral strategy, and the development of a heavily revised organisational structure. Such reforms paid dividends, alongside a favourable political environment, and in May 1997 'New' Labour won a landslide victory. In his contribution to What's Left of the Left, James Cronin provides a nuanced account of New Labour's period in office. In contrast to those analyses which have emphasised the straightforwardly neo-liberal char-acter of the governments led successively by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, he offers a rounded and balanced account that notes some progressive successes as well as the standard litany of failures. There is much that is commendable in such a concise account of New Labour: the attention given to some of the finer points of New Labour's record, the emphasis on historical circumstances, and the wide scope of the points made by Cronin. Cronin's overall conclusion is perhaps too generous: given the existing constraints - emphasised throughout the chapter and indeed the volume - he argues that 'Labour's policies were more or less where they ought to have been' (Cronin, 2011, 138). Granted, Labour achieved more between 1997 and 2010 than many of its critics readily admit. But I cannot help thinking that in retrospect historians will see the massive majorities of 1997 and 2001, in the context of a centralised polity, as missed opportunities to attempt a more decisive reshaping of British politics. Almost certainly, alongside intervention in Iraq, considerable opprobrium will be heaped on the personal dynamics of the administration and the problematic relationship between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown which did much to undermine its capacity to secure fundamental reforms. In part Cronin does not address such issues. To be fair, his scope is limited in a single chapter. Nevertheless, I think that some of his detail comes at the expense of an analysis of the wider issues surrounding Labour's years in office. As a result broader matters do not get quite the attention that they deserve. I offer two examples here. The first of these concerns the nature of New Labour's agenda; the second relates to New Labour's model (and its connection to the economic crisis).
In terms of Labour's agenda, I think it would be useful had Cronin said more about New Labour's capacity to shape its own identity. He emphasises the shifting context in which Blair won the May 1997 general election: the reforms of the Thatcher governments, a dramatically changed electorate, and a profound and far-reaching economic transformation of the United Kingdom. This approach risks suggesting that, by 1997, New Labour was wholly reactive, an empty vessel that simply responded to external stimuli whether in the form of the demands of Thatcherism or the priorities of a materialistic and individualised electorate. I am not persuaded that such an approach fully captures the complexity of New Labour. Cronin touches on this matter in his discussion of the 'Third Way'. The Third Way offered an attempt by New Labour to define its agenda and map out an identity. But it was never wholly satisfactory, given the bland principles upon which it was based and the uncertain meaning with which it was deployed. Few figures within Labour seemed wholly at ease with the concept. Perhaps, given its failure to establish itself, none ever fully accepted it as the basis for the party's new identity. So the problem of characterising New Labour as a reactive force remains.
Yet a number of the party's initiatives appear to be neither wholly responsive nor to be based in a meaningful sense upon the Third Way. Most obviously, perhaps, intervention in Iraq was neither guided by the logic of Thatcherite developments nor constructed as a response to electoral pressures. To this list might be added, arguably at any rate, foundation hospitals in their detailed development, academies in secondary education, the various New Deals, and tuition fees in higher education. All have features which are different to, and, I think, go beyond the Thatcherite settlement of the 1980s and 1990s. Foundation hospitals and tuition fees do not appear to be grounded in an electoral coalition: far from it, they alienated voters that New Labour might have been expected to target. But academic attempts to find a theoretical 'lens' with which to characterise New Labour's identity have not developed greatly since discussions of the mid-1990s (and they now seem quite dated). Cronin backs off from such an analysis. With regard to Iraq, he side-steps the question rather deftly by asking what a social democratic response to 9/11 and Iraq might have looked like: 'even now the present lack of a clear alternative suggests that getting it right would have been very hard' (Cronin, 2011, 134). It is an interesting puzzle. But the question remains as to why an administration that apparently put so much emphasis on popular preferences embarked on such a risky and problematic trajectory. Indeed, if New Labour was driven by the median voter model, it appeared to act at critical points in a remarkably cavalier fashion.
In terms of the overall model, I think it would have been useful had James Cronin engaged more directly with the economic arguments underpinning New Labour. There has been much praise of New Labour's management of the economy, particularly during its first two terms in office and in its initial response to the financial crisis in 2008. Gordon Brown's decision to give operational independence to the Bank of England days after taking office in 1997 appeared to pay huge dividends by providing a framework in which steady economic growth could take place. Following a number of careful years...
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