Leveraging International Legal and Human Rights Mechanisms: Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar
| Author | Rachel Fleming |
Leveraging International Legal and Human
Rights Mechanisms: Efforts to End Forced
Labour in Burma/Myanmar
Rachel Fleming*
This Article explores the origins of the
interrelated legal concepts of slavery and
forced labour, with a particular focus on the
unusual role played by the International
Labour Organisation in the development of
the right to freedom from forced labour. It sets
out the pervasive use of state-ordered forced
labour in Burma/Myanmar1, and the inherent
complexities surrounding ending this practice
* Rachel Fleming is currently pursuing an MA in Human Rights
Law at SOAS, University of London. She is a human rights
practitioner with a decade of experience working on human
rights issues in Burma/Myanmar.
1 Leaders of Chin, Kachin and Shan homelands agreed to join
together with Burman leaders to found the Union of Burma in
1948, following independence from British colonial rule. In 1989
the military regime unilaterally changed the name of the country
to Myanmar, which historically only referred to the majority
Burman territory and had never included the other ethnic
homelands. The change to Myanmar was recognised by the UN
and is used in common parlance, but many human rights
defenders from ethnic minority backgrounds continue to prefer
the term Burma. To reflect this duality, this author will use
Burma/Myanmar in reference to the country.
16 SLJ 5(2)
in a country where the military is beyond
civilian control. In doing so, it foregrounds
the role of local human rights organisations in
documenting human rights violations and the
myriad ways in which they have leveraged
this evidence through international legal and
human rights mechanisms and cooperation
with the International Labour Organisation.
This has led to partial success, but significant
challenges remain to eradicate this practice in
Burma/Myanmar and ensure accountability
for perpetrators.
I. Introduction
There is abundant evidence before the
Commission showing the pervasive use of
forced labour imposed on the civilian
population throughout Myanmar by the
authorities and the military for portering, the
construction, maintenance and servicing of
military camps, other work in support of the
military, work on agriculture, logging and
other production projects undertaken by the
authorities or the military, sometimes for the
profit of private individuals, the construction
and maintenance of roads, railways and
bridges, other infrastructure work and a range
of other tasks... Forced labourers, including
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 17
those sick or injured, are frequently beaten or
otherwise physically abused by soldiers,
resulting in serious injuries; some are killed,
and women performing compulsory labour are
raped or otherwise sexually abused by
soldiers... It is a story of gross denial of
human rights to which the people of
Myanmar have been subjected particularly
since 1988 and from which they find no
escape except fleeing from the country.2
The pervasive use of forced labour – legalised by colonial-era
statutes3 – and the intersecting forms of human rights
violations perpetrated by the Burma/Myanmar military and
local authorities have been well-documented by local
organisations since the early 1990s. Such reports prompted
the establishment of an International Labour Organisation
(ILO) Commission of Inquiry in 1998 into the alleged
violations of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, to which
Burma/Myanmar is a State party.
2 Extracts from the International Labour Organisation
Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labour in Myanmar, 1998;
Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma): Report of the Commission
of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation to examine the observance by
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),
(1998) available at
73/myanmar5.htm#(4)%20Recommendations> Accessed 5
August 2018.
3 Villages and Towns Acts 1907.
18 SLJ 5(2)
In addition to the observations highlighted above, the
Commission of Inquiry concluded:
[A]ny person who violates the prohibition of
recourse to forced labour under the
Convention is guilty of an international crime
that is also, if committed in a widespread or
systematic manner, a crime against
humanity.4
In spite of the gravity of such findings, the struggle to end the
practice of forced labour in Burma/Myanmar, and ensure the
State’s compliance with its obligations under the 1930 Forced
Labour Convention has continued ever since.
In 2010/11, Burma/Myanmar agreed to participate in the first
cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) under the UN
Human Rights Council (HRC); at the time, it had only ratified
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Burma/Myanmar apparently viewed this new international
human rights mechanism5 as an opportunity to defend its
abysmal human rights record to peer States within the HRC,
after years of criticism about human rights violations in
Burma/Myanmar from the CEDAW and CRC treaty bodies
4 Report of the Commission of Inquiry (n 3) [538].
5 Created under the UN Human Rights Council by a UN General
Assembly resolution (3 April 2006), UN Doc A/RES/60/251.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 19
and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar.6
Human rights organisations from Burma/Myanmar civil
society were primarily based in exile at that time, as it was
not possible for them to operate freely inside the country due
to the considerable security risks. However, they maintained
clandestine networks inside the country, via which they
collected documentation of human rights violations.
Organisations were already engaging with well-established
mechanisms by providing briefings and shadow reports
based on this documentation, and seized the opportunity to
influence the new process. One such organisation was the
Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), established in
1995. CHRO made an individual submission to the process,
which was strongly represented in the stakeholders’ report
compiled by the Officer of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) as one of the three short reports
forming the basis of the review, conducted via interactive
dialogue at the HRC.7 In the submission, forced labour is
cited as a primary human rights concern and a root cause of
6 The country-specific Special Rapporteur’s mandate was first
created in 1992 by the Commission on Human Rights resolution
E/CN.4/RES/1992/58, and has been extended every year since
then.
7 The author of this paper worked as Advocacy Director at
CHRO for six years and prepared the organisation’s UPR
submissions based on analysis of human right documentation
collected by fieldworkers. CHRO's submission was cited 11
times in the stakeholders’ report, on a par with Human Rights
Watch.
20 SLJ 5(2)
flight, contributing to the exodus of around 150,000 Chin to
India and Malaysia:8
In Chin State the use of forced labour by the
military and local authorities is widespread
and systematic. Since 2006 more than 70
incidents of forced labour have been
documented by CHRO, some involving
orders to 40 villages at a time.9
This claim was strongly substantiated by a report published
by the international NGO Physicians for Human Rights
(PHR) in January 2011, 10 shortly prior to the UPR interactive
dialogue. The report was based on a quantitative survey of
over 600 households in Chin State conducted in early 2010
(by CHRO fieldworkers and others at considerable personal
risk), and covered violations which had taken place in the
preceding twelve months. The key finding was that almost 92
percent of households had experienced forced labour during
that timeframe, on average three times per household. Forced
labour was exacted by the military and local authorities, and
took similar forms to those outlined in CHRO’s submission. 11
Such findings bore a striking similarity to those of the ILO’s
Commission of Inquiry more than a decade earlier, and PHR
8 CHRO, ‘Burma/Myanmar: Individual Submission to the UN
Universal Periodic Review’, July 2010, 1[3], 2.
9 Ibid 3 [11].
10 PHR, ‘Life Under the Junta: Evidence of Crimes Against
Humanity in Burma's Chin State’, January 2011.
11 Ibid, 11.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 21
concluded that such violations may constitute a crime against
humanity.12
In a recalcitrant atate like Burma/Myanmar where impunity
is constitutionally entrenched, the rule of law is lacking, there
is no independent judiciary13, and the State is not a party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) (Art. 8(3)(a) ‘No one shall be required to perform
forced or compulsory labour’), the challenges in bringing an
end to the practice of forced labour are immense. The
military remains beyond civilian control as per the military-
drafted 2008 Constitution, and is in charge of the three key
Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. The
Constitution also provides for immunity from prosecution to
all past and present military personnel and government
officials for acts committed in the course of their duties, and
guarantees the military control over its own judicial
processes via an opaque court martial system, which is
beyond civilian oversight.14 The Commander-in-Chief can
effectively stage a coup if a state of emergency, threatening
national unity, should arise; and the military holds a de facto
veto over constitutional change as 25 percent of
parliamentary seats are reserved for military appointees, and
12 Ibid.
13 During his time as mandate-holder (2008-2014), UN Special
Rapporteur Quintana consistently emphasised the importance of
legal and judicial reform as core ‘human rights elements‘
required in the country.
14 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008,
Art 445, 294.
22 SLJ 5(2)
constitutional change can only be enacted with a
parliamentary majority of over 75 percent.15
Part II of this Article traces the role of the ILO in the
development of the right to freedom from forced labour.
First, the origins of the interrelated legal concepts of slavery
and forced labour as they appear in the relevant conventions
Convention of 1930) are briefly discussed. Second, the work
of the Human Rights Committee in clarifying the scope of the
right to freedom from forced labour and obligations of States
under Art. 8 of ICCPR is critically examined. Third,
developments in the ILO’s approach to the right to freedom
from forced labour under the 1930 Forced Labour
Convention are introduced.
Part III of this Article turns to the case of Burma/Myanmar,
and highlights how documented evidence of human rights
violations by local human rights groups has underpinned
legal efforts to end the practice of state-ordered forced labour
in the country. Taking Hopgood’s dichotomy of human
rights/Human Rights as a frame of reference, with ‘human
rights’ characterised as local activism and ‘Human Rights’ as
a ‘global structure of laws, courts, norms’,16 this Article
argues that in this case, rather than the global inevitably
structuring, disciplining, and colonising the local,17 the
15 Constitution of Myanmar 2008, Art 20 (b), 40 (c), 436 (a).
16 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell
University Press 2013) ix.
17 Ibid x.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 23
dichotomy is not so clear-cut. It traces the role of local
organisations in establishing the ILO Commission of Inquiry
and the subsequent ILO individual complaints procedure, the
only international human rights mechanism of its kind in
operation in Burma/Myanmar. 18 This Article argues that
organisations like CHRO are deeply rooted in their
communities, allowing them to document human rights
violations and utilise that evidence as a vital resource to form
strategic partnerships with international organisations,
engage with international legal and human rights
mechanisms, and ultimately garner institutional leverage to
bring about positive changes – albeit limited – in practice.19
II. The Role of the ILO in the Development of the
Right to Freedom from Forced Labour
The fight against slavery is often described as the first human
rights campaign.20 For example, Anti-Slavery International,
founded in 1839, claims to be ‘the oldest human rights
organisation in the world’ and works to end modern slavery,
18 Burma/Myanmar has not acceded to the individual complaint
mechanisms for CEDAW or CRC, or those for the more recently
ratified Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ratified in 2017) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (ratified in 2011).
19 Nicholas Henry, ‘Trade Union Internationalism and Political
Change in Myanmar’ [2015] 27(1) Global Change, Peace &
Security, 69-84, 82-83.
20 Vladislava Stoyanova, ‘United Nations Against Slavery:
Unravelling Concepts, Institutions and Obligations’ [2017] 38(3)
The Michigan Journal of International Law 359, 361.
24 SLJ 5(2)
characterized as taking a multitude of forms - including
forced labour.21 Scholars such as McGeehan make the
compelling argument that attempts to enumerate all the
forms of a complex phenomenon like slavery risk quasi-
legitimising new forms of slavery as they develop.22
Nonetheless, the legal concept of slavery has undergone
fragmentation in international human rights law, resulting in
legal obfuscation around interrelated concepts of slavery,
servitude, human trafficking, and forced labour.23 The origins
of this fragmentation pre-date the birth of international
human rights law.
i. The Origins of Slavery and Forced Labour
under International Law
The 1926 Slavery Convention’s definition of slavery remains
the accepted definition under international law today:
‘[S]lavery is the status or condition [emphasis added] of a
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership are exercised.’24 The reference to condition
as well as legal status arguably proscribes both de facto and de
jure slavery.25 In spite of the fact that the Slavery Convention
does not actually define forced labour, it calls on States parties
21 Anti-Slavery International ,
accessed 1 June 2018.
22 Nicholas L. McGeehan, ‘Misunderstood and Neglected: the
Marginalisation of Slavery in International Law’ (2012) 16(3)
IJHR 436, 455.
23 Stoyanova (n 21) 364.
24 Slavery Convention 1926, Art 1(1) 60 LNTS 253.
25 McGeehan (n 23) 444.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 25
to ‘take all necessary measures to prevent forced or
compulsory labour from developing into conditions analogous
to slavery [emphasis added]’.26 Herein lies the conceptual
fragmentation between slavery and forced labour. The
drafting of this Article was apparently the most contentious
make a distinction between forced labour for public and
private purposes, with public uses of forced labour being
justified as necessary for the ‘development’ of colonised
territories,28 ultimately reflected in the wording of the Slavery
slavery, colonial-era forced labour was viewed as ‘an
instrument of welfare’ to instil the so-called ‘dignity of
labour’. This remained the prevalent view for many years
26 Slavery Convention 1926, Art 5.
27 Jean Allain, The Slavery Conventions: The Travaux Préparatoires
of the 1926 League of Nations Convention and the 1956 United
Nations Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 121.
28 Ibid 122.
29 Slavery Convention 1926, Art 5(1) ‘Subject to the transitional
provisions laid down in paragraph (2) below, compulsory or
forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes [emphasis
added]. 5(2) In territories in which compulsory or forced labour
for other than public purposes still survives, the High
Contracting Parties shall endeavour progressively and as soon
as possible to put an end to the practice. So long as such forced
or compulsory labour exists, this labour shall invariably be of an
exceptional character, shall always receive adequate
remuneration, and shall not involve the removal of the labourers
from their usual place of residence. 5(3) In all cases, the
responsibility for any recourse to compulsory or forced labour shall rest
with the competent central authorities of the territory concerned
[emphasis added].’
26 SLJ 5(2)
after the process of decolonisation began.30 Instances of
forced labour imposed on colonial subjects were often brutal,
resulting in the deaths of labourers, and would have
arguably met the definition of de facto slavery enshrined in
the Slavery Convention.31
In 1926, the Assembly of the League of Nations passed a
Resolution requesting the ILO to address the issue of forced
labour.32 The resulting 1930 Forced Labour Convention
obliges States parties to ‘suppress’ the practice ‘within the
shortest possible period’.33 Forced or compulsory labour itself
is defined as, ‘all work or service which is exacted from any
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the
said person has not offered himself voluntarily’. The
Convention also sets out exceptions in the form of
compulsory military service, civic obligations or minor
communal works, emergencies, and services exacted as a
result of a conviction in a court of law. 34 The vast majority of
the Articles provided for the continuation of forced labour in
30 J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study
of Burma and Netherlands India (New York University Press 1956)
342.
31 Examples of this include the treatment of workers in the
Belgian Congo and during the Culture system in Java under
Dutch colonial rule, Ibid. See also McGeehan (n 23) 445-48.
32 League of Nations, ‘Slavery Convention: Resolutions adopted
by the Assembly at its meeting held on 25 September 1926’, Doc
A.123.1926.VI.
33 1930 Forced Labour Convention CO29, Art 1.
34 1930 Forced Labour Convention, Art 2(1) and 2(2)(a-e).
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 27
colonial contexts for a transitional period. 35 At the time, the
Workers' Group, under the tripartite structure of the ILO
(comprised of workers, employers and government
representatives), expressed misgivings about the primary
purpose of the text, but ultimately supported it as a step
forward.36 In short, the 1930 Forced Labour Convention
needs to be viewed as a legal instrument of its time; a
Foucauldian technology of rule for colonial powers
‘facilitative rather than proscriptive in character’.37
ii. Slavery and Forced Labour under International
Human Rights Law38
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked the
advent of international human rights law and stipulated that,
‘[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and
the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’ 39
Although forced labour is not explicitly mentioned, the
preparatory works indicate that it was considered to be a
35 Forced Labour Convention 1930 transitional provisions, Art 3-
24.
36 McGeehan (n 23) 447.
37 Ibid 445.
38 A more detailed discussion of the legal obfuscation around the
interrelated concepts of slavery, servitude, human trafficking,
and forced labour under international law is beyond the scope of
this paper. Of particular note is the fact that under international
criminal law, slavery is regarded as encompassing these
interrelated concepts. For in-depth analysis of these concepts
under both international human rights law and international
criminal law, see Stoyanova (n 21) and McGeehan (n 23).
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Art 4.
28 SLJ 5(2)
form of slavery.40 By contrast, Art. 8 of the legally binding
ICCPR – which did not come into force until almost 30 years
later –– enumerates slavery, servitude, and forced labour
separately, but does not define these concepts.41 The
preparatory works for that particular article did not refer to
Instead, drafters appeared to focus on de jure rather than de
facto slavery, viewing slavery as a ‘limited and technical
notion’ involving the ‘destruction of the juridical
personality’.42 Furthermore, drafters decided not to include
the definition of forced labour enshrined in the 1930 Forced
Labour Convention, on the basis that it was unsatisfactory
when read in light of the exceptions.43
The treaty body for the ICCPR – the Human Rights
Committee (HRCtee) – clarifies both the scope of the rights
protected and the obligations of States in the course of its
work. Firstly, the HRCtee issues General Comments, which
40 United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘The
Commission on Human Rights Second Session: Report of the
Working Group on the Declaration of Human Rights’ (10
December 1947) UN Doc. E/CN.4/57 8.
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
Art 8 (1), (2), and (3)(a) 999 UNTS 171.
42 United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘The
Commission on Human Rights Sixth Session: Summary Record
of the Hundred and Forty-Second Meeting, Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights – Art. (continued), Art 8 (10 April
1950) UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.142, 16 [74], 17-18 [79].
43 United Nations General Assembly, 'Tenth Session: Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights' (1 July 1955) UN Doc
A/2929, 33 [19].
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 29
are directed at all States parties and interpret the substantive
provisions of the treaty. Secondly, in response to State
reports submitted in accordance with their reporting
obligations, the HRCtee produces Concluding Observations,
which clarify the duties of States. Lastly, where a State party
has acceded to the Optional Protocol, the HRCtee issues
quasi-judicial Views on individual cases brought under the
complaints procedure, providing further clarification of the
scope of the rights protected.44 Stoyanova’s analysis of
Concluding Observations produced between 2014 and 2016
found that those which address Art. 8 are largely concerned
with human trafficking, and overlook the concepts
specifically enumerated in the Article.45 She argues that, ‘The
overview reveals a tendency in favour of framing only
traditional practices as slavery and servitude and a resistance
to using these labels to contemporary forms of abuses.’46 The
right not to be held in slavery has never been the object of a
View, and only one View deals with an interpretation of
forced or compulsory labour.
The complainant in Bernadette Faure v. Australia maintained
that she was subjected to forced or compulsory labour in
violation of Art 8(3)(a) of the ICCPR (‘No one shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour’) as she
had to attend a work programme in order to receive benefits.
In the View, the HRCtee noted that work forming part of
44 Bantekas and Oette International Human Rights Law and Practice
(CUP 2016) 198-217.
45 Analysis of Concluding Observations issued 2014 – 2016;
Stoyanova (n 21) 400-403.
46 Ibid 402-403.
30 SLJ 5(2)
normal civil obligations is permissible under ICCPR
art.(8)(3)(c)(iv) (‘any work or service which forms part of
normal civil obligations’), and therefore it did not fall within
the scope of forced labour. The HRCtee made reference to
ILO instruments but not to the definition of forced labour,
maintaining that it fell to the Committee to ‘elaborate on the
indicia of prohibited conduct.’47 The HRCtee's ratio for its
View was largely based on ‘the absence of a degrading or
dehumanising aspect of the specific labour performed’48,
thereby providing a rather narrow interpretation of forced
labour in comparison with the definition provided under the
1930 Forced Labour Convention.
Although to date the HRCtee has issued 35 General
Comments on most of the substantive provisions of the
ICCPR, a notable exception is Art. 8.49 This perhaps reflects
the challenges of consolidating its experience in interpreting
a conceptually fragmented Article. However, the HRCtee’s
narrow interpretation of Art.8 is arguably contrary to its own
specified approach of progressive interpretation of the
ICCPR as a living instrument applicable to contemporary
situations.50 The HRCtee has ultimately failed to both
effectively elaborate on the legal concepts enshrined in Art.8
47 Human Rights Committee, Bernadette Faure v. Australia (23
November 2005) UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1036/2001, 11 [7.5].
48 Ibid.
49 Available on the OHCHR treaty body database
50 Human Rights Committee, Judge v. Canada (13 August 2003)
20[10.3] UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 31
of the ICCPR and bring them to life in light of new and
evolving forms of human rights abuses.51
iii. The ILO’s Approach to Forced Labour
Given the wholly inauspicious origins of the 1930 Forced
Labour Convention, it is somewhat surprising that over the
years the ILO has taken a more progressive approach to
interpreting and clarifying the concept of forced labour, in
line with the principle of effectiveness and the doctrine of
dynamic interpretation of treaties.52 However, the unique
tripartite structure of the ILO allows for the inclusion of non-
state actors in its decision-making processes, which in turn
shapes the approach of the organisation, alongside its
supervisory mechanisms.53 Although it became the first
specialised agency of the UN in 1946, it is not generally
considered as part of the UN human rights system and is
often overlooked in mainstream discourse and academic
literature on human rights.54 Nonetheless, the organisation
itself has long used the language of human rights in its
approach to forced labour.
51 Stoyanova (n 21) 408.
52 For further discussion of these principles see Jonas
Christoffersen, ‘Impact on General Principles of Treaty
Interpretation’ in Menno Kammigna and Martin Sheinin (eds.)
The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law
(OUP 2009), 37-62.
53 Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions (Polity Press
2007) 107-110.
54 Ibid.
32 SLJ 5(2)
In 1968, the ILO’s Committee of Experts (CoE) – a key
component of the supervisory mechanisms, comprising 20
independent jurists – noted that forced labour was the first
human rights issue dealt with in ILO standards,55 and
subsequently referred to the 1930 Forced Labour Convention
as a basic human rights instrument.56 The CoE issues detailed
comments in response to ratifying States’ reports ––
submitted every two years –– and employs General Surveys
as a supervisory mechanism, providing interpretation of
particular conventions and a detailed examination of their
implementation by both ratifying and non-ratifying States.57
In its 2007 General Survey on forced labour, the CoE
affirmed that the so-called transitional period under the 1930
Forced Labour Convention which allowed for the
continuation of forced labour ‘expired long ago’ and found
that ‘[Articles 3 to 24] are therefore no longer applicable.’58
Art. 7 of the 2014 Protocol to the 1930 Forced Labour
Convention formally removes those provisions, and enjoyed
widespread support at the time of its adoption. 59 By its 2012
55 ILO Committee of Experts General Survey: Forced Labour (1968)
177 [4].
56 ILO Committee of Experts General Survey: Eradication of Forced
Labour (2007) 115 [209].
57 Lee Swepston, ‘Forced and compulsory labour in international
human rights law’ (ILO 2014) 10.
58 ILO Committee of Experts General Survey: Eradication of Forced
Labour (2007) 112 [196].
59 Beate Andrees and Amanda Aikman, ‘Raising the Bar: the
Adoption of New ILO Standards Against Forced Labour’ in
Prabha Kotiswaran (ed), Revisiting the Law and Governance of
Trafficking, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery (CUP 2017) 359-394,
380.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 33
General Survey, the CoE referred to the prohibition of forced
labour as ‘a peremptory norm of international law on human
rights.’60
In addition to paving the way for the removal of the
facilitative provisions of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention,
the CoE has provided dynamic interpretation of the three
key elements of the definition of forced labour contained
therein: namely voluntary offer, work or service, and menace
of any penalty. Voluntary offer ‘refers to the freely given and
informed consent of workers to enter into an employment
relationship and to their freedom to leave their employment
at any time’ while work or service ‘includes all types of
work, service and employment, regardless of the industry or
sector within which it is found, including the informal sector’
(barring the permissible exceptions). 61 Particularly
progressive – especially when contrasted with the
interpretation of forced labour put forward by the HRCtee in
Bernadette Faure v. Australia – is that menace of any penalty
‘should be understood in a very broad sense: it covers penal
sanctions, as well as various forms of coercion
…[and]…might also take the form of a loss of rights or
privileges’.62 It is also noteworthy that over the years, there
appears to have been a convergence in the concepts of
slavery and forced or compulsory labour within the ILO
60 ILO Committee of Experts General Survey: Giving Globalisation a
Human Face (2012) 103 [252].
61 Ibid 111 [271], 111 [269].
62 ILO Committee of Experts General Survey: Eradication of Forced
Labour (2007) 20 [37].
34 SLJ 5(2)
understanding.63 For example, Recommendation No. 190 lists
forced labour as a practice similar to slavery.64
Although Art.8 of the ICCPR confers the individual right to
freedom from forced labour whilst the ILO 1930 Forced
Labour Convention merely obliges States parties to
’suppress’ the practice over time, the ILO has done much
more than the HRCtee to clarify the scope of the right to
freedom from forced labour. In practical terms, even if
Burma/Myanmar were a State party to the ICCPR and to the
Optional Protocol establishing an individual complaints
mechanism, the HRCtee has limited naming and shaming
measures at its disposal in cases of unsatisfactory
implementation, which are largely ineffective when dealing
with recalcitrant States.65 The ILO does have enforcement
mechanisms at its disposal but has only used them once in
‘the most famous and fully litigated case in ILO legal
history’,66 namely Burma/Myanmar.
Part III explores the role of local organisations in the
Commission of Inquiry (CoI) in this case and the subsequent
individual complaints procedure. As noted earlier, this is the
63 Swepston (n 58) 13.
64 ILO General Conference, ‘Recommendation concerning the
prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the
worst forms of child labour’ Recommendation 190 (17 June
1999).
65 Bantekas and Oette (n 45) 324.
66 Brian Langille, ‘The Curious Incident of the ILO, Myanmar
and Forced Labour’ in Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilock (eds)
Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2015) 509.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 35
only international human rights mechanism of its kind in
operation in Burma/Myanmar, established after years of ILO
negotiations. Part III then turns to the role of CHRO in
engaging with the UPR mechanism over the timeframe of
one complete cycle of the UPR, in order to increase leverage
with the ILO in an effort to end forced labour in Chin State.
Finally, Part III considers to what extent such efforts have
been successful.
III. Leveraging International Legal and Human
Rights Mechanisms to End Forced Labour in
Burma/Myanmar: a Success Story?
According to Hopgood’s thesis, global organisations will not
only attempt to structure and institutionalise the local, but
that this becomes an inevitable process of colonisation.67
Hopgood argues that there is inherent tension between top-
down authorities or ‘Human Rights’ as a global structure of
laws and norms, and grassroots local human rights
activism.68 This suggests a clear-cut dichotomy between the
work of local human rights activists and global norms and
institutions, which is not entirely evident in practice. In
certain cases, local human rights activism can and does
leverage global organisations and/or institutions for its own
ends. This arguably reflects tremendous tenacity and
commitment rather than a process of colonisation in the case
67 Hopgood (n 17) x, 172.
68 Ibid x.
36 SLJ 5(2)
of efforts to bring an end to the practice of forced labour in
Burma/Myanmar.
i. The Role of Local Organisations: the ILO
Commission of Inquiry
Most academic literature on the ILO’s CoI on forced labour in
Burma/Myanmar tends to focus on the tripartite structure of
the ILO – and in particular the role of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in representing
workers –– as the most important factor in its
establishment.69 This arguably sidelines the crucial role of
grassroots organisations in producing the documentary
evidence of forced labour and leveraging the ICFTU within
the tripartite structure, obliging the ILO to act.
The Federation of Trade Unions Burma (FTUB) was
established on the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border by leading
trade unionists who had fled the country in 1988, following
the brutal crackdown by the junta. They maintained a
clandestine network of activists within Burma/Myanmar,
who collected information about incidents of forced labour
and smuggled it out of the country.70 The FTUB collected
considerable evidence of portering exacted by the
69 Patrick Bollé, ‘Supervising Labour Standards and Human
Rights: The Case of Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma)’ (1998)
137 ILR 391, 396-399; Francis Maupain, ‘Is the ILO Effective in
Upholding Workers’ Rights?: Reflections on the Myanmar
Experience’ in Philip Alston (ed) Labour Rights as Human Rights
(OUP 2005) 96-97; and Richard Horsey, Ending Forced Labour in
Myanmar: Engaging a Pariah Regime (Routledge 2011) 12-16.
70 Henry (n 20) 71.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 37
Burma/Myanmar military, a practice which routinely
involves civilians being compelled to carry weaponry,
ammunition or other supplies for the military on foot in
active conflict zones, often for days at a time, while being
subjected to physical abuse. The FTUB first utilised their
human rights documentation in 1991 by working in
conjunction with the ICFTU, who submitted FTUB’s evidence
of compulsory portering to the ILO Committee of Experts.71
This was followed by a formal representation by the ICFTU
regarding Burma/Myanmar’s violations of the 1930 Forced
Labour Convention under Art. 24 of the ILO Constitution in
1993, again based on evidence provided by the FTUB.72
Finally, in 1996, the ICFTU filed a complaint regarding
portering and forced labour on large-scale infrastructure
projects based on information collected by the FTUB and
other local human rights organisations, which resulted in the
Governing Body establishing a Commission of Inquiry
pursuant to Art. 26(3) of the Constitution.73
Similarly, although the three independent experts on the CoI
were subsequently denied entry to Burma/Myanmar, they
reviewed some 6,000 pages of documentary information,
much of which was provided by CHRO and other local
organisations such as the Human Rights Foundation of
Monland, the Shan Human Rights Foundation, and the Karen
Human Rights Group. This included several hundred
71 Ibid 73 and Bollé (n 70) 396.
72 A representation can be made by either the employers’ group
or the workers’ group under Art 24 of the ILO Constitution 1919,
available at accessed 3 June 2018.
73 Henry (n 20) 73.
38 SLJ 5(2)
Burma/Myanmar military orders issued to village leaders,
requiring them to provide labourers. The experts on the CoI
also travelled to border areas in India, Bangladesh and
Thailand and took testimony from some 250 people who had
been forced to flee as a result of their experiences of forced
labour.74
ii. The Role of Local Organisations: Follow-up
Mechanisms
The CoI made three key recommendations, which continue to
form the basis of ILO implementation monitoring today:
(1) that Myanmar National legislation be
brought into line with Convention No. 29
without further delay…;
(2) that in actual practice no more forced or
compulsory labour be imposed by the
authorities, in particular the military;
(3) that the penalties which may be imposed
for the exaction of forced labour be strictly
enforced, with thorough investigation,
prosecution and adequate punishment of
those found guilty. 75
74 Report of the Commission of Inquiry (n 3) Appendices IV and
V.
75 Key excerpts published in the International Labour Office
Report to the Governing Body, ‘Follow-up to the resolution
concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar
adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013)
(5 November 2015) ILO Ref GB.325/INS/7(Rev.) 1 [4].
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 39
Although the regime could have appealed against these
recommendations to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it
chose not to; but neither did it move forward with their
implementation.76 This prompted the unprecedented threat
of punitive measures (to be decided by individual ILO
members) in a Resolution under Art. 33 of the ILO
Constitution in 2000 –– again proposed by the ICFTU, with
the FTUB playing an instrumental role behind the scenes.77
ILO progress in negotiating monitoring mechanisms for the
implementation of the CoI recommendations via numerous
High-Level Missions was stilted during this period and
marred by setbacks. In 2002, a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed, but the attempted assassination
of Aung San Suu Kyi at Depayin the following year saw the
adoption of some Art. 33 measures.78 In 2004, an informal
complaints mechanism was established, but the regime
prosecuted both complainants and their lawyers, alleging
that these were ‘false complaints’ and insisting that the
regime was within its sovereign right to prosecute. Two high
profile cases around this time included the labour activist Su
Su Nway and the lawyer Aye Myint. 79 By 2006, the Workers
Group secured support for a motion that the International
Labour Conference should review possible action to be taken
76 ILO Constitution (n 74) Art 29.
77 Henry (n 20) 72.
78 The US government adopted sanctions via the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act (28 July 2003), based, at least in part,
on the ILO Resolution in favour of Art 33 measures. Maupain (n
70) 107.
79 Ken Maclean, ‘Lawfare and Impunity in Burma since the 2000
Ban on Forced Labour’ (2012) 36 Asian Studies Review 189 – 206.
40 SLJ 5(2)
by the ILO under its Constitution to ensure
Burma/Myanmar’s compliance with the CoI
recommendations, and prevent retaliatory action against
complainants.80 It is noteworthy that by this time the FTUB
was able to directly participate in ILO proceedings through
accreditation from the ICFTU and its successor, the
International Trade Union Confederation.81
The ILO subsequently gave serious consideration to possible
actions that could be taken under international law, including
referral to the ICJ under Art. 37(1) of the ILO Constitution for
either an advisory opinion, or a binding ruling regarding
Burma/Myanmar’s conduct and its obligations under the
1930 Forced Labour Convention. The ILO’s guidance note
also set out the various possibilities for international criminal
prosecution of alleged perpetrators of forced labour –– albeit
rather remote, as Burma/Myanmar is not a State party to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court –– given the
findings of the 1998 Commission of Inquiry and subsequent
reports of the ongoing pervasive use of forced labour by the
military and other authorities in Burma/Myanmar, as
documented by local human rights organisations and
80 International Labour Conference, ‘Additional agenda item:
Review of further action that could be taken by the ILO in
accordance with its Constitution in order to: (i) effectively secure
Myanmar’s compliance with the recommendations of the
Commission of Inquiry; and (ii) ensure that no action is taken
against complainants or their representatives’, (Provisional
Record Ninety-fifth Session Geneva 2006) ILO Doc ILC.95/PR/2,
21-24 and Appendix I.
81 Henry (n 20) 74.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 41
included in reports by the UN Special Rapporteur.82 There
were – and remain – considerable jurisdictional83 and
political barriers to individual criminal prosecutions,
particularly given that such legal action by the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court is dependent on a referral
by the UN Security Council. Overall, the possibility of ILO
referral to the ICJ raised complex and untested legal
questions, but ultimately provided the ILO with significant
leverage.84 The regime was forced to make concessions, and
finally, in 2007, the Supplementary Understanding (SU) was
successfully negotiated, which provided for the formal
establishment of an individual complaints mechanism.85
82 International Labour Office Governing Body, ‘Developments
concerning the question of the observance by the Government of
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29): Legal
aspects arising out of the 95th Session of the International
Labour Conference’ (November 2006) ILO Doc GB.297/8/2. See
also ‘Collected Reports to the UN General Assembly by the
Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar 1992 – 2009’ and ‘Collected Reports to the Human
Rights Council and the Commission on Human Rights by the
Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar 1992 – 2009’, compiled by the Online
Burma/Myanmar Library and available at
83 Ibid 5-10 [14]-[32].
84 Richard Horsey, ‘The International Labour Organisation and
Forced Labour in Myanmar’ in Pedersen and Kinley (eds)
Principled Engagement: Negotiating Human Rights in Repressive
States (Routledge 2016) 118.
85 ILO, Supplementary Understanding between the Government of
Myanmar and the International Labour Office, and other associated
documents (2007) 1 [1].
42 SLJ 5(2)
Under this mechanism, once a complaint has been
investigated and upheld by the Liaison Officer, it is passed to
the government’s Working Group for action. Victims are
entitled either to compensation, an apology, or guarantee of
non-recurrence, while the perpetrators may be punished.86
Although under the SU, ‘Complaints submitted under the
present Understanding shall not be a ground for any form of
judicial or retaliatory action against complainant(s)…’,87 in
practice some reprisal prosecutions of complainants continue
to date, particularly of human rights defenders. 88 In spite of
the risks, people have consistently utilised the complaints
mechanism since 2007.89 This needs to be understood in the
context of the absence of rule of law and the lack of an
independent judiciary in the country; the ILO complaints
mechanism – albeit flawed –– is therefore the main avenue
for redress for forced labour.
86 ILO forced labour complaints mechanism
accessed 5 June 2018.
87 Supplementary Understanding (n 86) 1 [9].
88 International Labour Office Report to the Governing Body,
‘Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on
the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd
Session (2013)’ (7 February 2018) ILO Doc GB.332/INS/8 4 [15].
89 International Labour Office Report to the Governing Body,
‘Report on ILO activities in Myanmar’ (20 February 2018) ILO
Doc GB.320/INS/6(Rev.), Appendix I.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 43
iii. Engaging the UPR to Increase Leverage with
the ILO: the Work of CHRO
As noted earlier, at the time of the first cycle of the Universal
Periodic Review of Burma/Myanmar’s human rights record
under the UN Human Rights Council in 2010/11,
Burma/Myanmar was only a State party to CEDAW and
CRC. At the time of writing, the ILO individual complaints
procedure is the only human rights mechanism in the
country. The 1930 Forced Labour Convention, the complaints
mechanism, and forced labour were key issues raised during
the interactive dialogue.90 The Convention, the 2002
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and 2007
Supplementary Understanding formed the legal basis for
CHRO’s recommendations to Burma/Myanmar as part of the
UPR. CHRO called on the regime to cooperate fully with the
ILO to end the practice of forced labour; hold awareness-
raising seminars in Chin State; and reproduce leaflets about
the complaints mechanism in ethnic Chin languages.91
There were 35 documented incidents of forced labour in
CHRO’s individual submission to the second cycle of the
UPR in 2015, in comparison with 70 in the first submission,
representing a fifty percent reduction in the number of
documented incidents of forced labour in Chin State.92 It is
90 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Working Group on
the UPR: Myanmar’ (24 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/9.
91 CHRO (n 9) 5 [25].
92 CHRO, ‘Burma/Myanmar: Individual Submission to the UN
Universal Periodic Review’ (March 2015) 5 [19].
44 SLJ 5(2)
difficult to assess to what extent the ILO complaints
mechanism itself brought about this change, in part because
the publicly available statistics about complaints are not
disaggregated geographically. However, in line with CHRO’s
UPR recommendations, an ILO focal point was appointed for
Chin State to facilitate complaints – one of only four in the
country – and leaflets distributed in some of the Chin
languages.93
Perhaps more importantly, CHRO’s strategic partnership
with PHR for research and advocacy purposes increased
CHRO’s leverage both with the ILO and within the UPR
process. PHR’s report, accompanied by photographs of
forced labour provided by CHRO, received media coverage
in at least 250 media outlets around the world. In Geneva
CHRO representatives met with Kari Tapiola, Special
Advisor to the ILO Director-General, as well as with dozens
of diplomats from Permanent Missions to the UN in Geneva
and lobbied for CHRO’s UPR recommendations on forced
labour. Three recommendations on forced labour put
forward by States during the Review were accepted by
Burma/Myanmar.94 Although the recommendations are not
93 ILO ‘Report to the Governing Body’ (March 2012) ILO Doc
GB.313/INS/6 7 [27].
94 ILO ‘Report to the Governing Body’, (March 2011) ILO Doc
GB.310/5 6[33]. Recommendations put forward by Slovenia,
New Zealand and France, UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of
the Working Group on the UPR: Myanmar’ (24 March 2011) UN
Doc A/HRC/17/9 and UN Human Rights Council ‘Addendum:
Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 45
legally binding, they do indicate political commitment on the
part of the State under review. Implementation of the
accepted recommendations also forms part of the monitoring
process in subsequent rounds of the UPR. These
recommendations therefore enhanced the ILO’s negotiating
power on their High-Level Mission to the country the
following month.95
A key commitment secured during that Mission was for a
high-level joint Ministry of Labour-ILO awareness-raising
seminar in Chin State; arguably a direct result of CHRO’s
advocacy.96 The seminar – the first of its kind in Chin State –
took place in May 2011, attended by 160 senior personnel
including military officers and judges.97 This was particularly
significant, because the seminar was held jointly with the
Ministry of Labour and therefore any subsequent report of
forced labour could be followed up directly under the
original MoU, rather than relying on the individual
complaints mechanism. CHRO took advantage of this
avenue and some forced labour practices reported to the ILO
in Burma/Myanmar were brought to an end soon after
reporting. In one high-profile case involving the Chief
Minister of the Chin State, CHRO fieldworkers affirmed that
the violation stopped within two weeks of reporting it to the
commitments and replies presented by the State under review
[Myanmar]’ (27 May 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/9/Add.1.
95 Ibid 6 [33].
96 Ibid 4 [25].
97 CHRO, ‘CHRO Welcomes ILO's Visit to Chin State’, 21 May
2011
accessed 5 June 2018.
46 SLJ 5(2)
ILO. As such, CHRO’s engagement with international legal
and human rights mechanisms to end the practice of forced
labour can be qualified as a partial success.
Both the Commission of Inquiry and the subsequent
individual complaints mechanism would have arguably
never been established without the documentary evidence of
forced labour produced by CHRO and other local
organisations. For CHRO in particular, the strategic
partnership with PHR reinforced its leverage within the UPR
process, which in turn worked in tandem with ILO
mechanisms to bring about significant change in practice on
the ground; a partial but nonetheless hard-won human rights
success in a recalcitrant state like Burma/Myanmar.
iv. Assessing Progress against the Commission of
Inquiry Key Recommendations
The same notion of partial success is evident to some degree
in assessing progress against the implementation of the three
key recommendations made by the CoI in 1998 over the time-
frame of one cycle of the UPR. The first key recommendation
called for legislative reform to bring Burma/Myanmar’s
domestic law in line with its obligations under the 1930
Forced Labour Convention. Although Order 1/99 and its
Supplementary Order in 2000 issued under the former
military regime stipulated that illegal exaction of forced
labour shall be punished as a penal offence, the colonial-era
1907 Towns and Villages Acts legally authorised the use of
forced labour and remained on the statute books. The 2012
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 47
Ward and/or Village Tract Amendment Act does bring
domestic legislation in line with the Convention, although
significant challenges with accountability remain.98
The third key recommendation of the CoI clearly sets out that
in order to meet its obligations under the 1930 Forced Labour
Convention, Burma/Myanmar must pursue accountability for
alleged perpetrators of forced labour. In practice there has
arguably been very limited progress in this area, which is
unsurprising given the constitutional constraints outlined
above and the lack of rule of law in the country. As of
November 2015, according to the ILO no person had been
prosecuted under the forced labour provisions of the 2012
Ward and/or Village Tract Amendment Act.99 Since the 2007
Supplementary Understanding establishing the complaints
mechanism, more than 275 prosecutions of military personnel
had taken place by November 2015. However, these were
conducted under the military’s court martial system, which
lacks civilian oversight. The punishments ranged from formal
reprimands, fines, demotion, and dishonourable discharge to
imprisonment, 100 raising questions over whether this
constitutes ‘adequate punishment of those found guilty’ as
98 ILO Report of the Governing Body, ‘Review of the situation in
Myanmar on issues relating to ILO activities, including forced
labour, freedom of association, and the impact of foreign
investment on decent working conditions’ (5 March 2015) ILO
Ref GB.323/INS/4, 4 [18(b)].
99 International Labour Office Governing Body ‘Follow-up to the
resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of
Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013)’
(5 November 2015) ILO Doc GB.325/INS/7(Rev.) 5 [27].
100 Ibid 5 [26].
48 SLJ 5(2)
required under the third key CoI recommendation, given the
gravity of forced labour violations.101 Furthermore, the ILO
noted reluctance on the part of the authorities to bring some
cases of forced labour to final closure to the satisfaction of the
complainants.102
With regard to the second and arguably most important
recommendation, the ILO continued to receive reports and
complaints of forced labour – including by the military – over
the time-frame of the UPR cycle, although these have
gradually reduced in number.103 In March 2015, the ILO
observed that, ‘while considerable progress has been made,
there remains a long way to go in respect of both the policy
settings and the adaptation of behaviours required for their
application.’104 A number of both positive and negative
factors need to be taken into consideration in order to
understand this piecemeal progress. In March 2012, President
Thein Sein’s Burma/Myanmar government made a public
commitment to eradicate forced labour by the end of 2015,
and signed a new Memorandum of Understanding with the
ILO to this effect, including a highly detailed plan of action
101 Ibid 5 [26] 1 [4].
102 Ibid 5 [28].
103 Ibid 4 [18]-[19].
104 International Labour Office Report of the Governing Body,
'Review of the situation in Myanmar on issues relating to ILO
activities, including forced labour, freedom of association, and
the impact of foreign investment on decent working conditions'
(4 March 2015) ILO Doc GB.323/INS/4, 1 [4].
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 49
for tackling different forms of forced labour.105 The
Commission of Inquiry and subsequent follow-up
mechanisms ensured that the ILO has a strong mandate in
the country, and that the ILO has consistently pursued a
strategy of sustained pressure and engagement whilst also
providing essential technical assistance. However, political
will on the part of the Burma/Myanmar government has
ultimately proven to be limited in terms of pursuing
prosecutions to end impunity for forced labour, and
eradicating the practice altogether. The peace process
initiated in 2012 is flawed, with renewed armed conflict
breaking out in both ceasefire and non-ceasefire areas, 106 and
throughout 2015 the military continued to exact forced labour
from the civilian population in active conflict zones.107
At the time of writing, the complaints mechanism and the
2012 Memorandum of Understanding and detailed action
plan have been extended until the end of 2018, but only after
protracted and difficult negotiations with the government of
105 Strategy for the Elimination of Forced Labour (Joint
Government of the Republic of Union of Myanmar and
International Labour Organisation) (16 March 2012) available at
bangkok/---
iloyangon/documents/genericdocument/wcms_191415.pdf>
accessed 5 June 2018.
106 See for example
June 2018.
107 International Labour Office Report of the Governing Body (4
March 2015) (n 105) 3 [13].
50 SLJ 5(2)
Burma/Myanmar.108 The ILO continues to receive complaints
via the mechanism, but the authorities also persist in bringing
reprisal cases against high-profile complainants in forced
labour cases.109 Local human rights organisations continue to
document cases of forced labour, especially in active conflict
zones where demands for portering and other forms of
forced labour by the Burma/Myanmar military are
ongoing.110 Future strategies to eradicate forced labour and
end impunity for this practice in Burma/Myanmar are mired
in uncertainty, given that political will appears to be
dwindling, the military is constitutionally beyond civilian
control, and significant political hurdles remain to further
recourse to international legal action.
108 International Labour Office Report to the Governing Body (7
February 2018) (n 89) 1 [1]-[2].
109 Ibid 4 [15]–[16].
110 Shan Human Rights Foundation, ‘Burma Army LIB 147 uses
forced labor, loots food and requisitions civilian trucks during
military operation against SSPP/SSA in Hsipaw’ (4 December
2017)
burma-army-lib-147-uses-forced-labor-loots-food-and-
requisitions-civilian-trucks-during-military-operation-against-
sspp-ssa-in-hsipaw> accessed 5 June 2018 and Karen Human
Rights Group, ‘Dooplaya Incident Report: Forced labour
ordered by Tatmadaw officer in Win Yay Township, October
2017’ (3 April 2018)
incident-report-forced-labour-ordered-tatmadaw-officer-win-
yay-township> accessed 5 June 2018.
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 51
IV. Conclusion
This Article has traced the origins of the interrelated legal
concepts of slavery and forced labour, and critically analysed
their interpretation under international human rights law. It
has argued that in spite of the provisions of the colonial-era
1930 Forced Labour Convention that provided for the
perpetuation of forced labour, over time the International
Labour Organisation has adopted a progressive approach to
interpreting and clarifying the concept of forced labour and
developing the right to freedom from forced labour. This
Article has sought to present a nuanced analysis of the
significant challenges to ending this practice in the complex
context of its pervasive use by the military and local
authorities in Burma/Myanmar. In particular, it has
foregrounded the paramount role of local human rights
organisations in establishing both the 1998 ILO Commission
of Inquiry, and its follow-up mechanisms. It has
demonstrated that local engagement with international legal
and human rights mechanisms can have a positive impact on
the ground – albeit limited, in a recalcitrant state –in terms of
changing practice. It has argued that rather than being
colonised by global institutions, organisations, and
mechanisms, local human rights organisations have
successfully leveraged them. Although the challenges remain
– particularly in terms of accountability, legal protection for
complainants, and satisfactory resolution of complaints –
local human rights organisations will undoubtedly continue
to play a leading role in addressing these challenges over the
long term.
52 SLJ 5(2)
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of Crimes against Humanity in Burma’s Chin State’ (January
2011)
United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘The
Commission on Human Rights Second Session: Report of the
Working Group on the Declaration of Human Rights’ (10
December 1947) UN Doc E/CN.4/57
United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘The
Commission on Human Rights Sixth Session: Summary
Record of the Hundred and Forty-Second Meeting, Draft
Efforts to End Forced Labour in Burma/Myanmar 57
International Covenant on Human Rights - article 7
(continued), article 8’ (10 April 1950) UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.142
United Nations General Assembly, 'Tenth Session: Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights' (1 July 1955) UN
Doc A/2929
United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar’
(24 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/9
United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Addendum: Views
on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary
commitments and replies presented by the State under
review [Myanmar]’ (27 May 2011) UN Doc
A/HRC/17/9/Add.1
Websites
Anti-Slavery International
Burma Library
Chin Human Rights Organisation
Democratic Voice of Burma
International Labour Organisation
Karen Human Rights Group
Myanmar Peace Monitor
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Shan Human Rights Foundation
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