Irish women for Lisbon.
| Author | Gallagher, Niamh |
| Position | Irish voters' rejection of the Lisbon treaty |
A friend was travelling through Frankfurt on Saturday 14 June 2008; the day Ireland's rejection of the Lisbon treaty at referendum hit the press. A committed yes voter, she was deeply disappointed by the No vote in Ireland, and relieved to get away from the airwaves and newspapers proclaiming doom.
In the turmoil at home, she had not stopped to consider the European response; but in Frankfurt airport it was clear that Ireland's No was not simply a national disappointment, but a European one too. Newspaper headlines glared shock, disbelief and regret at Ireland's No in a variety of European languages. Photos of the small, rightwing, Catholic organisation COIR celebrating the No vote adorned the front pages of the major international titles--their numbers having disproportionately influenced the referendum result.
Not everyone in Ireland was celebrating. At home, as the reality of the morning after dawned, there were two reactions. One, a fierce disappointment among committed Europhiles, combined with bubbling anger at the government who, again, had got this wrong. The other reaction was more tentative: a sense, largely among 'soft' No voters--those that were still unsure that they had done the right thing--that we hadn't quite understood that a No vote at the polling booth would mean this.
Lisbon is not the first time that Ireland has rejected a European treaty at referendum. The Nice treaty was voted down by the electorate in 2001, to the shock of the then government, who took it for granted that the Irish people understood the benefits of EU membership, and needed little convincing or cajoling to come out in its support. They were wrong: 35 per cent of Irish people turned out to vote for Nice, and 54 per cent of them voted against it. The high level of abstention was deemed the key reason for the No vote; but the emotive issue of neutrality as part of the debate was another factor.
Nice was brought to the people a second time in October 2002, justified by the low turn out for the first vote, a re-elected government, and a changed international environment post-September 11. This time EU enlargement was the core Yes campaign issue; and neutrality had been removed from the debate through a set of declarations guaranteeing Ireland's exclusion from any EU Common Defence arrangement. Nice was passed by a majority of 63 per cent, with 49.5 per cent of the population voting. The government could breathe a sigh of relief. But not for long.
This article will examine why Ireland voted No to the Lisbon treaty in June 2008. It will describe why a second referendum is considered reasonable, and necessary. Finally, it will look at the necessity of a more targeted approach to campaigning this time around, and in particular the establishment of Women for Europe, a civil society group set up by women, for women, to campaign for a Yes vote.
Why a No vote
In the run up to the Lisbon treaty campaign in June 2008 internal party political issues dominated the Irish government's concerns. The then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern was being questioned at a tribunal about controversial payments received by him in the 1980s and 1990s. The story dominated the media, and appeared to be at the heart of concerns held by the governing Fianna Fail party.
The Lisbon treaty--essentially an attempt to reform the EU institutions to make them more efficient--appeared small fry on the political radar in comparison. The main opposition parties, Fine Gael and Labour, took a similar view, using the referendum campaign as an opportunity to profile candidates for the local elections in 2009, with campaign posters featuring enormous photographs of politicians with a miniscule yes for Lisbon in the corner. Indeed, the Yes campaign is better remembered for the gaffes by senior politicians--the Tanaiste (1) famously appeared not to know how many Commissioners the larger member states had, while the Taoiseach and Ireland's Commissioner both boasted that they had not even read the treaty--than for any real debate on the treaty or Ireland's role in Europe.
For those opposed to the Lisbon treaty--a collection of 'non-mainstream' organisations ranging from the extreme right to the far left of the political spectrum, and one political party, Sinn Fein (2)--the disinterest and distraction displayed by the political establishment allowed them a golden opportunity to set the parameters of the debate. Between them, Libertas, COIR and Sinn Fein captured the public's attention by playing to people's very specific concerns about the European Union. Conscription, abortion and tax harmonisation--emotive issues for the Irish people--were raised by the No side as key issues, though in reality they had little to do with the Lisbon treaty.
By playing on people's lack of knowledge about the EU, and their growing cynicism with domestic politics, the No side moved the debate away from the purpose of the Lisbon treaty. Instead, its campaign focused on dubious interpretations of certain aspects of the treaty, which it presented as negative and threatening for the Irish people (3). The Yes side, unexpectedly out of their comfort zone--the intention of the treaty and the EU's contribution to Ireland being their...
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