Dismissal and the Religious Workplace
Author | Tanvee Nandan |
DismissalandtheReligiousWorkplace
TanveeNandan*
Thispaperdealswiththequestionofwhetheran
individualshouldeverbedismissedfromtheir
workplaceforconductoutsidetheworkplaceand
workinghours,withspecificreferencetoreligious
workplaces.Itexploresthenotionofwhetherthere
isanythingthatsetsreligiousworkplacesapart
fromotherplacesofemployment,allowingfora
greaterdegreeofcontroloverthebehaviourofits
employees.Itisarguedthatthereisnospecialduty
ofloyaltyattributabletoreligiousworkplacesand,
giventhatindividualsfindtheirrighttoexpress
theirreligioncurtailedbythecourtsregularly,the
autonomygrantedtoreligiousinstitutionsgoes
againstthefundamentalconceptofhumanrights.
Introduction
Thispaperwillconsiderthequestionofwhetheranemployer
shouldeverbeabletolawfullydismissaworkerbecauseof
his/heractivitiesoutsidetheworkplaceandworkingtime.
Thispaperisrestrictedtotheissuesarisingfromthe
dismissalofemployeesfortheirconductoutsidethe
workplaceandworkinghours.Iarguethatthisshouldnotbe
alawfulcausefordismissalinthereligiousworkplace,with
226SLJ5(1)
theonlyexceptionbeingwheretheconductisinbreachofan
essentialqualificationofworkoftheemployee.
ReligiousfreedomhasbeengrantedunderArticle9ofthe
EuropeanConventionofHumanRights(“ECHR”)andis
applicabletotheindividualaswellastocollectivefreedomof
religion.However,initsimplementation,theEuropeanCourt
ofHumanRights(“ECtHR”)hasbeenfarmoreliberalin
determiningcollectivefreedoms,ratherthanindividual
freedoms.Ibelievethelattershouldguidetheirdecisions.
Whilereligiousinstitutionsaregrantedincreasingautonomy
todeterminetheirfreedom,thesameisfarfromtruefor
individualsexercisingreligiousfreedom.Mypaperisa
critiqueofthistendencyoftheECtHR,specificallyfocusing
onthedismissalofemployeesfortheirconductoutsidework,
vis‐à‐visreligiousworkplaces.
Thefirstsectionconsiderswhethercertainviewsof
employeesinreligiousinstitutionscanbeconsidered
‘disloyal’totheemployer,andwhetherdismissalonthose
groundsislawful.Thesecondsectionassessestheargument
ofautonomygrantedtoreligiousinstitutionstomake
independentdecisions.Thethirdtacklestheassumptionthat
thereissomethingspecialoruniqueaboutreligious
workplaces,whichcreatesahigherdutyofloyaltythan
others.Fourthly,Icontendthatthethresholdfordismissing
anemployeeonthebasisoftheirconductoutsidework
shouldbebasedon‘necessaryqualification’,whichistosay
thatanemployeeshouldonlybedismissediftheirconduct
outsideworkinterfereswiththeperformanceoftheirduties
orqualityofworkproduced.Finally,Iwillconcludeby
summarisingmyargumentsandreiteratingmyviewthat
employeesshouldnotordinarilybedismissedfortheir
conductoutsideofwork,saveforwhensuchconduct
breachesthe‘necessaryqualification’criterion.
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