• Agency Problem in Non-Profit Corporations. a Comparative Law and Economics of US and Italian Systems

Lambert Academic Publishing
Publication date:

(Giovanni Tamburrini (LLM in Corporate Governance and Public Policy at the Queen's University of Belfast and Ph.D. in Comparative Law University at the Sapienza University of Rome) is Assistant Professor of "Business Law and Ethics" and "Social Entrepreneurship" at Solbridge International School of Business.)


The identification of the corporate interest represents a very fundamental step to define directors’ responsibilities and to facilitate the judicial enforcement of their duties. In order to pursue this goal, contractual and institutional theories have been developed through structural and functional approaches. While these theories have been set to study business corporations, this monographic work is meant to apply them to the non-profit corporation context. The analysis, which is conducted through the comparative law method – with particular attention to the UK, US and Italian system – aims at underscoring that the marketization of the third sector is regrettably threatening the accomplishment of the social, ethic and moral values that non-profit organizations have historically pursued.

MATERIA: Non-Profit Corporations Agency Problems Directors' Responsibilities